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ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a novel mechanism to provide with se-curity to existing Data-Centric Storage (DCS) 
solutions for Wireless Sensor Networks. The goal is to achieve a high security level without modifying 
standard DCS premises or increasing the network overhead. This means we just use the messages an 
operations already deﬁned by DCS solu-tions. Our goal is to fulﬁl two security requirements: (i) only 
legitimate nodes for an application should be able to access the information of that application, and 
(ii) avoid  long-term Denial of Service attacks targeting an application that operates in the network. 
Toward this end we deﬁne two diﬀerent solutions depending on whether the sensor nodes in the network 
are resource-limited or powerful. We run exten-sive simulations and discuss the eﬃciency of the 
proposed solution under two diﬀerent DCS solutions: GHT that pro-poses to use a single and static 
storage node per application, and STARR-DCS that uses multiple storage nodes per appli-cation that in 
addition change over the time. Based on the obtained results and discussion we conclude that changing 
replication nodes over the time is by itself a smart approach to avoid long-term attacks.
WSN, Data-Centric Storage (DCS), Security.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been studied for
a decade now and are slowly being exploited in real appli-
cations. In the classical literature WSNs are deﬁned in a 
hierarchical way where the sole mission of sensor nodes is to 
monitor external parameters and send them to a central base 
station that will be in charge of processing them and take 
decisions. However, with the advance on the study of WSNs we 
can also ﬁnd self-managed WSNs where no central node is 
required to allow the network to operate, so sensor nodes are in 
charge of storing and processing the informa-tion and take 
decisions in a distributed manner avoiding the necessity of a 
powerful central base station. An example of these networks are 
the so-called unattended sensor networks [7, 23, 22] that are 
deployed in remote areas (e.g. dessert, volcano, jungle, etc) with 
diﬃcult human-access and prob-lems to establish long distance 
communications to remotely monitor the WSN. Furthermore, 
these self-managed WSNs, where sensors need to communicate to 
each other and take decisions, can be seen as a ﬁrst step in the area 
of Internet of Things (IoT). Similarly to the sensor nodes in self-
managed WSNs, IoT devices create networks where they 
communi-cate to each other and have necessity to store and 
process the information and take decisions based on the processed 
information.
We can ﬁnd a large catalogue of sensor nodes (and IoT de-
vices) going from very low-resource nodes (and very cheap) 
to very powerful nodes (and much more expensive as com-
pared to the previous ones) that include powerful Operative 
System that bring them close to being a small computer 
instead of the traditional concept of a sensor mote. These 
powerful nodes are much more versatile and allow to pro-
gram complex algorithms that require high storage and pro-
cessing capacities, but eliminates the traditional paradigm of 
dealing with very limited but very cheap devices, whose goal 
is to use many of these devices (tens, hundred or even 
thousands) to complete complex tasks. In this paper, we will 
take into account both type of sensors and propose a solution 
according to their features.
A third aspect that we need to discuss in the introduction 
is what is the application scope of a WSN. Generally, WSNs 
are understood as application oriented, that is, a WSN is 
designed to implement a single task (i.e. run a single appli-
cation). Although it may be reasonable that sensor nodes 
implement a single task at the application layer, there are 
many basic and common tasks that can be shared by sen-sor 
nodes in the network belonging to diﬀerent applications. For 
instance, sensor nodes could route packets for nodes that are 
participating in a diﬀerent application. In addition, sen-sor 
nodes could act as storage nodes for data that belongs to a 
diﬀerent application, so the only associated task is to reply 
back that information in case the node is queried for
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it. Under these conditions it would be feasible to deploy
large-scale WSNs where diﬀerent companies share their sen-
sors for basic tasks getting the advantage of distributing the
deployment cost to cover large areas.
Therefore, the context of this paper is on self-managed
WSNs composed by a large number of sensor nodes belong-
ing to diﬀerent applications but sharing common tasks such
as routing and storage.
In this context Data-Centric Storage (DCS) [19] appears
as a promising solution. DCS was introduced as a novel
distributed information storage and delivery mechanism in
which a node is selected as a rendezvous point to store all
the events of a particular application. Then, for instance,
one node in the network stores all temperature events, an-
other node humidity events, another one ﬁre events, etc. All
nodes producing information of a particular application (i.e.
producer nodes) compute the rendezvous node (named home
node) for that application, and store its information on it.
In turn, a node that wants to retrieve information from that
application (i.e. consumer node) just needs to query the
home node that replies with the application’s stored data.
The beauty of DCS is that each node locally computes which
is the home node for a particular application, and by using
the underlying routing layer can store/retrieve data on/from
that home node.
The fact of using a single rendezvous point could lead to
overload that node in case of a high demanding application
(e.g. many temperature measurements stored in the node
and many queries to retrieve the temperature information
stored in the node). To alleviate this problem we proposed
STARR-DCS in [2, 3] in which several home nodes (or repli-
cas) are selected at random for only a limited amount of
time. After that time a new set of home nodes is selected
for the next period. In order to change the home nodes over
the time we divide the time in periods called epochs. Then,
during an epoch all application events are stored in the se-
lected home nodes. As demonstrated in [2] these solution
prolongs the network lifetime and distribute the network
load across all nodes in the network.
Using DCS (either with a single home node or with mul-
tiple replicas) under the proposed context presents serious
security concerns that need to be addressed. We are target-
ing networks where several applications (potentially from
diﬀerent companies) are running on top of the same WSN
taking the advantage of sharing network resources, including
storage. This implies that a sensor node of APPi could be
storing its events in nodes of APPj , where sensors of APPi
and APPj belongs to diﬀerent companies. Furthermore, if
none security mechanism is in place, any illegitimate node
could easily retrieve information for whatever application in
the network by just computing which are the home nodes for
that application. Even more, in case the goal of a malicious
node is to degrade de performance of a particular applica-
tion, it just needs to detect one (or more) rendezvous nodes
for an application and overload them by sending a large
amount of queries, thus avoiding legitimate nodes for that
application to access the stored information. We are mean-
ing that unless some security solution is provided performing
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks in DCS is straightforward.
Therefore, in this paper we want to propose a solution to
completely avoid or at least reduce as much as possible the
next three security problems:
1. A malicious node inserted in the network can access
information from an application it does not belong to.
2. A sensor node of APPj storing information of APPican
access that information.
3. A malicious node inserted in the network performs a
DoS attack to degrade the performance of an applica-
tion running on the WSN.
In this paper we propose two diﬀerent solutions depending
on the sensor nodes capacity. Our goal for both solutions is
to avoid the necessity of extending DCS paradigm with new
messages or functionalities. First we propose a very simple
solution that alleviates security issues 1 and 3 mentioned
above in case STARR-DCS is in place. In contrast, DCS
solutions that keep home nodes position static over the time
appears as an easy target for malicious nodes that after some
time can compromise an application. In addition, when sen-
sor nodes are powerful, we propose a second solution based
on Public-Key Cryptography. This solution solves the two
ﬁrst security issues above, but by itself cannot solve the DCS
attack unless it is applied in a dynamic DCS network where
home nodes of an application change over the time.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents a background on DCS. Section 3 is the core
piece of this paper where we introduce our proposal to pro-
vide with security DCS solutions. We present related works
in Section 4 and conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. DCS BACKGROUND
In this section we present the functionality of the original 
Data Centric Storage proposal [19] as well as our exten-
sion that uses multiple replicas that change over the time, 
referred as STARR-DCS (Spatio-Temporal Adaptation of 
Random Replication for Data Centric Storage) [2][3].
2.1 Basic DCS
Ratnasamy et al. [19], ﬁrst deﬁned the concept of Data 
Centric Storage (DCS). They combined the idea of a Dis-
tributed Hash Table (DHT) [20, 13, 16] together with the 
Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR)[12], a geographic 
routing protocol, to create a DCS system called Geographic 
Hash Table (GHT).
In order to employ geographic routing, this work assumes 
that sensors are able to locate themselves within the sensor-
net by using GPS or any other location device or system. In 
addition, the size and borders of the network are well-known 
by all nodes.
In GHT when a producer sensor detects an event, it uses 
a hash function over the application or event name (e.g., 
hash(’APP’)). The hash function provides as the output 
some spatial coordinates inside the sensor ﬁeld. Then, when 
a producer detects an event, it gets the spatial location pro-
vided by the hash function and invokes a put(k,d) operation, 
where k (e.g. ’APP’) following the key for the hash function 
above) is the key for the event type and d the data that for-
wards the data towards that spatial location using GPSR. 
The closest node to that spatial location becomes the home 
node for that event type and receives the producer message, 
because GPSR itself is enough to ﬁnd the closest node to a 
given position. In turn, when a consumer wants to retrieve 
the data related to that event type, it uses the same hash 
function over the event type, and thus it obtains exactly the
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same spatial location. Next, it uses a get(k) operation that 
forwards a query using GPSR to that spatial location, thus 
reaching the home node that replies with the stored data for 
that event type.
2.2 STARR-DCS
The main problem of GHT is that it proposes to use a 
single rendezvous or home node, which under high load ap-
plications will become saturated in a short time in terms of 
storage and processing, and what is more important it will 
run out of battery quickly.
Several papers in the literature [15] (from GHT authors)
[9][4][17] propose to use a uniform placement of multiple 
rendezvous nodes (referred as replicas or replications nodes 
throughout the paper) to alleviate the load of a single home 
node. The number of replicas selected directly impacts on 
the network load, which in turns aﬀects the network lifetime. 
The main problem of these approaches is that they fail on 
selecting an appropriate number of replicas. For instance,
[15] and [9] need to use as number of replicas(Nr) equal to 
4, 16, 64, 256, etc (i.e. follows a formula Nr = 4d, where  
d=1, 2, 3, 4, etc). In many cases none of the possible values 
is suitable, but a value in between should be used instead.
STARR-DCS[2, 3] proposes to locate replicas at random 
in the network. This provides more ﬂexibility in the number 
of replicas selected, since the application can select what-
ever number. The results presented in [2] shows that Ran-
dom Replication improves all previous approaches in terms 
of minimizing the network load.
Furthermore, all previous solutions rely on static replicas. 
That is, they compute Nr positions for the replicas that do 
not change. Therefore, the closest node to each position 
is selected as rendezvous node until it runs out of battery. 
Then the next closest node is selected until it runs out of 
battery, and so on. This implicitly leads to the creation of 
big routing and sensing holes in the network that are very 
harmful for the network operation as reported in [2]. To 
solve this problem, STARR-DCS proposes to change repli-
cas over the time. That is, a set of nodes will serve as replicas 
for a given time window known as epoch. When the epoch 
expires a new set of random nodes will be selected, and so 
on. This dynamic solution eﬃciently distributes the energy 
expenditure across the network avoiding the big holes prob-
lem that appears in static solutions and eﬀectively extends 
the network lifetime in at least 60% as reported in [2]. Fi-
nally, STARR-DCS oﬀers a framework that includes all the 
protocols and mechanisms required to be implemented in 
real nodes.
Finally, we want to introduce the function used by STARR-
DCS to compute the location of the replicas which is nec-
essary to understand the solution proposed in this paper. 
STARR-DCS uses a very simple function, which is an adap-
tation of the hash function used by GHT to compute the 
home node. In STARR-DCS all nodes know its application 
key (k), the current epoch (e) and the number of replicas be-
ing used Nr in that application. With this information any 
node is able to compute the rendezvous points’ locations at 
any particular time. For that, a node just needs to compute 
the following hash operation: hash(k ⊕ e ⊕ i), ∀i ∈ [1, Nr ] 
that generates Nr random locations within the network. The 
closest nodes to those locations serve as rendezvous nodes.
3. SOLUTIONS FOR SECURING DATA
CENTRIC STORAGE
In this section we present our proposal to solve the se-
curity problems that exist when DCS (both in GHT and
STARR-DCS) is applied in self-managed WSNs with sen-
sors of diﬀerent applications sharing network resources. As
we described in the introduction we aim at providing simple
yet eﬃcient solutions according to the sensor nodes capa-
bility. In addition, we want to propose a solution that just
uses the premises already deﬁned for DCS, that is the use of
put and get operations without any further extension. With
this goal in mind we want to achieve or at least approach
the next security concerns:
1. A malicious node inserted in the network can access 
information from an application it does not belong to.
2. A sensor node of AP Pj storing information of AP Pi 
should not be able to access that information.
3. A malicious node inserted in the network performs a 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack to degrade the perfor-
mance of an application running on the WSN.
Let us start deﬁning what is the current security of GHT
and STARR-DCS in case an illegitimate node want to ex-
ploit DCS vulnerabilities to compromise the security of an
application.
In order to ﬁnd the home node in GHT the malicious node
just needs to know the key (k) of the targeted application
either to retrieve information or to perform a DoS attack
to degrade the application’s performance. Therefore, all the
security in GHT depends on how easy is to derive the key
of an application. Several DCS solutions propose straight-
forward mechanism to deﬁne k such as using the name of
the application itself, or assigning sequential key values to
the diﬀerent applications running in the network. Hence, in
these cases a malicious node could very easily jeopardize an
application.
In the case of STARR-DCS there are 3 input parame-
ters used in the hash function to produce the coordinates
of the replicas: the key (k) that identiﬁes the application,
a value i that goes between 1 and the number of replicas
(Nr), and the epoch identiﬁer (e). STARR-DCS is a bit
more secure than GHT due to the use of e. First of all, i
does not provide any security since is a mere sequence going
from 1 to Nr, and it may be enough to query one of the
replicas since depending on the operation mode they may
store the same information [3]. Nonetheless, inferring e is
not straightforward since it could be an arbitrary number
imposed by the application (not necessarily following a se-
quential order). However, STARR-DCS deﬁnes a non-secure
mechanism (named Meta-Information Service) to easily re-
trieve the value e for any application running in the network.
Thus, a malicious node could use that mechanism to get the
value of e. Then once a malicious node knows k and e can
ﬁnd all replica nodes and query them to get the information.
Although we could propose a solution to provide security to
the mechanism to get the value of e, this would be a solution
just oriented to STARR-DCS, and we want to ﬁnd a more
general purpose solution applying to any DCS system.
In this paper we assume that a malicious node could get
k and e and use the common hash function to all network
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nodes and compute the location of any replication node lo-
cation. In addition, we also assume that an attacker cannot 
infer the destination coordinates by overhearing the channel 
and analyzing the routing header. Security at the routing 
layer is out of the scope of this paper.
Finally, we must notice that depending on the sensor nodes 
capacity we could provide more or less secure solutions. 
Therefore, our goal is to provide a two diﬀerent solutions: a 
ﬁrst one for resource-constrained sensor nodes, and a second 
one for powerful sensor nodes.
3.1 Resource-constrained sensor nodes Solu-
tion: Hiding rendezvous nodes position
In a network where sensor nodes are very resource-limited
we cannot implement complex security mechanism (e.g. cryp-
tography) since it would not be supported by sensor nodes.
Then, if we assume that nodes can just use those function-
alities required for DCS solution, we can propose a solution
that increments the security level by just making more dif-
ﬁcult to ﬁnd where the rendezvous nodes are located.
When a malicious node wants to attack a particular ap-
plication it just simply needs to identify which are the nodes
acting as rendezvous nodes for that application (or the unique
home node in case of GHT) and query them. Assuming, that
the malicious node knows the application key, k (that would
be enough in GHT), and the epoch id, e, the malicious node
could easily perform an information retrieval or DoS attack.
In order to make the attack more diﬃcult, we propose
to include a new parameter s in the hash function which is
only known by the application nodes. This parameter will
be diﬀerent for each application and all nodes of an appli-
cation will be pre-programmed with the value of s for that
application. Hence, only nodes of that application will be
able to ﬁnd the rendezvous node for that application at any
time. Therefore, in order to ﬁnd the nodes serving as repli-
cas for a particular application an attacker would need to
implement a force brute attack generating random locations
and querying them, so that the closer node to that location
would respond in case it is in charge of the application with
key k that is being targeted by the malicious node.
The success time of the attack will be established (among
other parameters) by 2 parameters that are especially inter-
esting for us: the number of nodes in the network and the
number of replicas being used for the application. Next we
perform extensive simulation experiments and discuss the
results for each of these parameters
3.1.1 Number of nodes in the network
Figure 1 presents simulations results showing what is the
average number of queries (over 5000 experiments) a mali-
cious node would need to perform to success (i.e. ﬁnd the
actual home node) in a network with a single home node
for diﬀerent number of sensor nodes randomly deployed in a
network covering a square area of 1000x1000 m2. The num-
ber of nodes in the network varies from 100 to 1000 using a
step of 100.
As the number of nodes in the network is increased the
attacker needs to send more queries to reach the valid home
node. In particular we see a linear growth with the number
of nodes in the network. It is important to notice that even
for the smallest number of nodes evaluated (i.e. 100 nodes),
the attacker would need to issue 153 queries, which means it
will query half of the nodes twice before ﬁnding the correct
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Figure 1: Number of queries issued by a malicious
node to succeed in an attack to retrieve informa-
tion from a particular application with respect to
the number of nodes deployed in the network.
node. If we think on some kind of distributed and collabora-
tive misbehaviour approach it would be easy identifying and
ﬁltering the attacker. In addition, if we analyze more popu-
lated networks the results show that for a network with 500
nodes the attacker would need to launch 730 queries before
succeeding, and in case of having 1000 nodes in the network
this number would be close to 1400 queries in average.
It must be noted that in the networks we are target-
ing (self-managed WSNs) attackers will be battery-powered
nodes as well. Therefore, the more energy they expend be-
fore compromising the home node, the less remaining energy
they have to successfully complete their attack. Therefore,
in terms of security countermeasures, when we are not able
to fully avoid the attack it is important to provide solutions
that reduces the harmful eﬀects as much as possible. In this
case, the diﬀerence between having 100 or 1000 nodes in the
network implies that the attacker needs to expend roughly
10x more energy to succeed in the attack.
3.1.2 Number of rendezvous nodes
We analyze separately the case when the attacker aims to
retrieve information and the case when its goal is to perform
a DoS attack.
Illegitimate information retrieval.
As we introduced in Section 2 we can ﬁnd several solu-
tions in the literature (including STARR-DCS) that pro-
pose to use several replication nodes to store the content.
The worst case from the security point of view is when all
the replication nodes are storing all the information for a
particular application. In such case as soon as the attacker
compromise one replica it will get access to all the infor-
mation related to the targeted application. In this subsec-
tion we analyze the inﬂuence that the number of replication
nodes have in terms of security for this worst case.
Figure 2 presents the average number of queries issued
for an attacker when 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 replicas are used to
store the data produced by a particular application. For
this evaluation we have employed a 1000x1000 m2 network
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Figure 2: Number of queries issued by a malicious
node to succeed in an attack to retrieve informa-
tion from a particular application with respect to
the number of replication nodes used to store appli-
cations’ information.
where 1000 nodes have been randomly deployed. We have
averaged the number of queries out of 5000 experiments.
The graph clearly shows that using several replication
nodes is quite harmful in terms of security when we can-
not use any more sophisticated security mechanism (e.g.
cryptography). For instance, when we move from a single
home node to 2 replication nodes the attacker needs to send
around 2.5x less queries to succeed in its attack, and this
number is reduced more than 6x in case the application uses
5 rendezvous nodes.
Denial of Service attack.
In this case to perform a DoS attack the fact of having
multiple replicas helps on delay the attack success. In order
to fully avoid the operation of an application the attacker
needs to identify all the replicas and overload them so that
neither producers node (that store new application data in
the rendezvous nodes) nor consumer nodes (that query repli-
cas to retrieve the stored information) can normally operate.
For instance, in STARR-DCS when a node fails accessing
one replica it tries sequentially to access the rest of replicas
in that epoch until one of them is available. Therefore, if
the attacker does not disconnect all the replicas it will down-
grade the application’s performance, but all the sensors of
that application will be still able to operate.
Figure 3 shows the average number of queries that an
attacker needs to issue to fully disconnect an application for
diﬀerent number of replicas. We have used the same network
parameters than in the previous experiment.
As we expected the attacker will need more time to com-
promise replication nodes as they increase in number. Due
to the use of s in the hash function a malicious node will
need to randomly generate queries until it ﬁnds all Nr repli-
cation of nodes. The number of queries issued grows linearly
with the number of nodes.
3.1.3 Discussion for GHT and STARR-DCS
We want to discuss what is the real security improvement
achieved by this solution for resource-limited nodes in the
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Figure 3: Number of queries issued by a malicious
node to succeed in a DoS attack to fully avoid an
application operating in the network..
two systems we are using as reference in this paper: GHT
that uses a single and static home node, and STARR-DCS
that uses multiple rendezvous nodes that change over the
time.
GHT.
Based on the results the fact of using a single home node
is worthy from the security point view for those attacks that
wants to retrieve application information. However, from
the moment the attacker discovers the position of the home
node the security is broken and the attacker will be able
to access the application information at any time. That
is, once it ﬁnds some coordinates that bring its queries to
the current home node (even though they may not be ex-
actly the same coordinates produced using the parameter s
in the hash function), the attacker already knows a quite
close position to the exact coordinates. Therefore, when the
home node runs out of battery and the next closest node to
the hash output coordinates becomes the home node, the at-
tacker will need very few queries to ﬁnd the new home node.
It does not need to generate random locations again. This
weakness is due to using a static position for home nodes.
Therefore, following this reasoning DCS multi-replication
approaches that propose to use static coordinates for the
rendezvous nodes would be weaker for the information re-
trieval attack due to the use of multiple replication nodes
(as shown in Figure 2).
In the case of the DoS attack for GHT the reasoning is the
same. As soon as the malicious node ﬁnds the home node
location and have enough querying capacity to overload the
home node, it can perform a DoS attack until its battery
expires. In the case of multiple static replicas a full-DoS
attack is more costly since the attacker will need more time
to identify all the replication nodes, but once these nodes are
identiﬁed the attacker can perform a continuous full-DCS
attack that avoids the operation of the targeted application.
In a nutshell, if the attacker takes 20 minutes (e.g. 1200
queries sent once per second) to find the home node, from
that moment on, it will be able to access the information
for the targeted application and/or perform a DoS attack by
overloading the rendezvous node.
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STARR-DCS.
Based on the results the main weakness of STARR-DCS 
is the fact that it proposes to use multiple replicas, and this 
is initially a bad decision for the information retrieval at-
tack (i.e. the attacker wants to gather information from the 
targeted application). However, it has a strong character-
istic from the security point of view based on the fact that 
STARR-DCS changes the replicas over the time, and every 
time an epoch expires, a new set of replication nodes are 
selected at random. This means that even if the attacker 
succeeds in a particular epoch, once that epoch expires the 
attacker will need to start another brute force attack to ﬁnd 
the position of some of the new rendezvous nodes. There-
fore, in this case assuming that we can estimate the maxi-
mum query rate from an attacker we could easily protect our 
application by just tuning the epoch duration. For instance, 
let us assume we want to protect an application that is using 
3 rendezvous nodes in a network with 1000 nodes that cov-
ers an area of 1000x1000 m2. In addition, we predict that 
the maximum query rate of an attacker based on the type of 
nodes working in the network is 1 query per second. From 
Figure 2 we know that an attacker needs 350 queries in av-
erage to ﬁnd at least one of the three rendezvous nodes and 
access the desired information. This means that if we estab-
lish an epoch duration of 300 seconds (i.e. 5 minutes) the 
attacker would not be able to ﬁnd the current rendezvous 
nodes in time. But even more important, if the attacker 
is lucky and in just few queries ﬁnds one of the targeted 
application rendezvous nodes, it will have access to the in-
formation only for a limited amount of time.
Furthermore, the fact of changing the rendezvous nodes 
over the time eliminates the possibility of a long-term DoS 
attack since the attacker will be able to intensively load the 
attacked rendezvous nodes just for a limited amount of time. 
Therefore, in contrast to the static DCS solutions, STARR-
DCS appears as a good solution to avoid DoS attacks be-
cause it changes the replication nodes over the time.
In summary, although the proposed mechanism does not 
guarantee that the attacker will not be able to retrieve the 
targeted application information, it establishes a good secu-
rity solution for resource-limited sensor nodes that are not 
able to use cryptography mechanisms. This solution is very 
simple and does not add any overhead or complexity to DCS 
and make much harder the potential success of the attacker. 
In addition, we have discussed that changing the position 
of the rendezvous over the time does not only provides bet-
ter load balancing, and a longer network lifetime [2], but also 
considerably improves the security and avoids long-term DoS 
ttacks.
We must notice that the proposed solution for low-resource 
sensor nodes covers requirements 1 and 3 (see list above), but 
does not help to solve the second point. The only solution 
for that is to use some cryptography mechanism that avoids 
the storing node to access the information it is storing from 
other applications.
3.2 Powerful Sensor Nodes Solution: Public-
key Cryptography
The previous solution does not provide full guarantee that
the attacker will not access sensible information. Therefore,
while it is a reasonable solution under the premises estab-
lished for resource-constrained nodes, it would be a bad so-
lution when sensor nodes are powerful. In this case we can
provide a solution that fully ensures the access to the appli-
cation data to only authorised nodes.
The solution is as simple as using Public-Key Cryptog-
raphy. Each application will be assigned a Public-Private
key pair. These keys are pre-programmed in the sensor
nodes running the application. The Public-Key Cryptog-
raphy works as follows, the sender uses the Public-Key to
encrypt the message it want to send to the receiver. It must
be noted that the public key, as its name indicates, can be
used by any user. In turn, the receiver of the information
uses the Private-key (that only she knows) to decrypt the
message.
The Public-Key Cryptography would be mapped to the
DCS paradigm as follows. A particular application has pro-
ducer nodes that generates the information and send it to
the rendezvous nodes, and consumer nodes that query the
rendezvous nodes to retrieve the stored information. Then,
we propose that producer nodes use the public key to en-
crypt the application information before sending it to the
rendezvous node. In this way, the rendezvous node will
store only the encrypted data. In turn, any sensor node
in the network will be able to access the rendezvous node
and retrieved the stored data. However, only the consumer
nodes that posses the private key will be able to decrypt the
information gathered from de rendezvous node.
Therefore, a malicious node can retrieve the data for a
particular application but it will be unable to decrypt it.
This solution works for any DCS solution independently
on whether it uses a single or multiple nodes, or whether
the rendezvous nodes are static or change over the time. In
addition, it does not introduce any overhead since we still
rely on the simple put and get operations deﬁned by GHT.
The only overhead is in processing to encrypt/decrypt data.
This solution is valid for the information retrieval attack
since neither illegitimate nodes nor nodes storing data for
other application will be able to access the information.
Therefore, this solution fulﬁls requirements 1 and 2, but not
3 as it is deﬁned.
In order to prevent long-term DoS attack this solution
needs to be combined with a DCS solution that changes the
replicas over the time, such as the case of STARR-DCS.
4. RELATED WORK
The scope of this paper is security for Data-Centric Stor-
age in Wireless Sensor Networks.
We have already introduced and referenced previously in
the paper the main DCS solutions relevant for this paper.
For a broader view of DCS ﬁeld we recommend [4].
From the security side, researchers in the area have made
a great eﬀort that have led to a large variety of works for
WSNs security in the literature. We can ﬁnd surveys like [21]
that presents a quite complete overview of security in WSNs,
or [11] which presents a speciﬁc security analysis for secure
routing in WSNs. In addition, we can ﬁnd speciﬁc security
solution at all diﬀerent layers. For instance, authors in [10]
propose a full link layer security architecture. We can also
ﬁnd secure routing protocol proposals for WSNs like SNEP
or µTesla [14]. Finally, security issues in WSNs are also
studied at the application layer. For example, authors in [1]
analyze security issues in WSNs for healthcare applications.
Furthermore, in our paper we propose the use Public-key
Cryptography. Aligned to this we can ﬁnd quite a few works
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in the literature that studies the use of Key Cryptography
in WSNs [6][5][8].
In spite of the comprehensive work for both areas in WSNs,
DCS and security, we could just ﬁnd one previous work
merging them in order to provide with security to DCS solu-
tions, which is named pDCS [18]. As we do in this paper this
solution tries to propose a solution to avoid illegitimate users
to access non-allowed information, but it does not address
DoS attacks. They propose to use a set of keys that de-
pends on location and time. Although the solution is robust
it presents several drawbacks as compared to our proposal.
First, it relies on a DCS solution that divides the network
into grids, thus they do not talk about storage/rendezvous
nodes anymore, but about storage cells. This makes their
solution only valid for those DCS that performs such type of
division, which is not standard. In contrast, our solution is
valid for all type of DCS networks independently on whether
they perform network division into cells or not. Second, in
their solution (as in the one we propose) the attacker gen-
erates random locations to try to compromise the storage
cell for a particular application. The fact of relying on cells
facilitates a lot the brute force attack as compared to the
case when the attacker needs to generate actual coordinates
location. This happens because the number of cells in the
network is a lot lower than the potential coordinates. There-
fore, relying on actual coordinates instead of cells for storage
increases the diﬃculty of the attack. Third, pDCS requires
the use of temporal keys, that is the key used to store infor-
mation in a particular storage cell changes over time, thus
the authors assume sensors in the network are synchronized
and all of them are able to update the key at the same time.
However this is a too strong assumption since synchroniza-
tion in WSNs is a very complex issue that requires lot of
overhead and energy consumption to be solved. Finally,
pDCS is a static solution that does not take into account
the necessity of changing the storage cell for a particular
application over the time, which, as we have discussed in
the paper, is essential to avoid DoS attacks.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have discussed security aspects in the
ﬁeld of Data Centric Storage for Wireless Sensor Networks.
Our goal was to provide a security mechanism that: (i) avoid
(or at least complicate) the access of illegitimate nodes to
information that is restricted to nodes belonging to a par-
ticular application, and (ii) avoid the possibility of a long-
term Denial of Service (DoS) attack that totally or par-
tially impacts the operation of a particular application in
the network. Toward this end we have presented two dif-
ferent solutions that takes into account whether the sensors
are resource-constrained or powerful. On the one hand, we
have presented a ﬁrst solution for low-resource sensor which
is quite powerful for DCS solutions that have multiple ren-
dezvous nodes per application that change over the time, like
STARR-DCS. This solution considerably limits the access of
malicious nodes to illegitimate information and in addition
avoids DoS attacks. On the other hand, we have introduced
a solution based on Public-Key Cryptography suitable for
powerful sensor nodes with enough capabilities to perform
encryption/decryption functions. With this solution only
those nodes belonging to an application can access that ap-
plication’s information, however this solution by itself does
not solve DoS attack. Finally, we have learnt that chang-
ing home nodes over the time not only reduces network load
and extends network lifetime (as we demonstrated in pre-
vious works), but it has very positive impact on security,
since implementing this dynamism by default avoids long-
term attacks.
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